who and for what may be held criminally liable.
Of course, contemporarily we are not challenged with having to build legal systems from scratch. Even newly found states, such as the United States or Israel, based their legislation, at least to a marked extent, on the system of their former sovereign. This is not to say, however, that in such cases, or following serious political transformations (like the collapse of the communist regime in Poland), the government need not establish the axiological fundamentals of the state anew, and, consequently, set up a comprehensive scheme of criminal liability. One of the chief aims of this paper is to consider possibilities of searching for sources of the model of criminal liability (perceived not through the prism of a catalogue of prohibited acts, but as principles of responsibility placed normally in the general part of a criminal code) outside of the legal system. Again, I do not wish to detract from the importance of the problem of catalogues of prohibited acts or say it is not fit to be assessed from the perspective of ethical legitimacy of criminal law. On account of the confines of this paper I chose to focus my analysis on the part of criminal law that functions as a mutual part, i.e. all that in maths appears before a bracket.
I realize readers coming from the Anglo-American legal culture may regard the above thesis as self-evident. Moralism is one of the principal methods of explaining criminal law there, 3 however it is nowhere near as widespread in Poland and surely in many other countries which embrace formal arguments as justifications for newly proposed legislation. Nonetheless, even if this aspect of the piece is not deemed innovative, an attempt to single out personalism as a philosophical strand capable of aiding in construing and explaining criminal law is an entirely inventive proposition. Given the current condition of debates within legal philosophy it is difficult to tackle issues concerning the relations between law and morality. Ethical legitimacy of criminal law is just one case in point. Difficulties arise for at least two reasons. First, much has been said about the interplay between law and morality by lawyers and philosophers. Not only does this hamper one's ability to proffer an innovative account of the problem, but it also instils epistemic pessimism, as it were, by suggesting that the travails surrounding the relations between law and morality are impossible to dispel. A second and related reason is that looking for references or dependencies between law and morality necessitates, at some stage, delving into the notion of natural law. However, adoption of natural law as a declared point of reference generates a substantial risk as the term has proven ambiguous and triggered numerous intellectual controversies. Even though natural law has its place within debates at the core of legal philosophy, it tends to be overlooked in the discourse revolving around specific dogmatic branches of the law. Therefore, an attempt to overlay, as it were, natural law onto the academic discussion may be perceived as unprofessional and unscholarly. The Polish doctrine of criminal law and, it may be surmised, the tradition of civil law inherently permeated by legal formalism, are dominated by the dogmatic-literal construction which, at all costs at times, is used to seek solutions to multiple challenges that the state and its legal system must face up to. Doubtless, the dogmatic-literal method is capable of offering answers to difficulties cropping up in the process of applying the criminal law. However, a law-enforcing institution grappling with a difficult question posed thereto often resorts, in light of the limitations of the leading interpretative trend, to discretion and equity whilst ostensibly couching its decision in terms characteristic of dogmatism-literalism. One example of such an equity-based decision is the resolution of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Poland dated 12 December 2007 (citation number: III KK 245/07) where it was pronounced that "Extraordinary mitigation of punishment for a defendant guilty of aggravated murder by virtue of Article 148 § 2 of the Criminal Code, where he faces 25 years' or life imprisonment, is not contrary to the substantive law because there is no provision that would prohibit the application of this device, and deduction of such a prohibition from the fact that the legislator neglected to determine the principles of extenuating the punishment of 25 years' imprisonment would lead to an alteration of the principles of criminal liability enshrined in the Code, in a way falling foul of the constitutional principle of a state ruled by law". The case concerned Andrzej A. who was convicted of aggravated murder and using an identification document belonging to another person. 4 The court extraordinarily mitigated A.'s sentence and stated it at 12 years.
5
Pursuant to Article 148 § 2 of the Criminal Code, a person is guilty of aggravated murder if they kill another:
1) with particular cruelty, 2) in connection with hostage taking, rape or robbery, 3) for motives deserving special condemnation, 4) with the use of explosives.
Historically, this criminal offence used to be subjected to imprisonment for not less than 12 years, 25 years or life. However, the Act of 27 July 2005, which entered into force on 16 September 2005, limited the range of punishments available to 25 years' and life imprisonment. Ultimately, due to improprieties of formal nature this amendment was struck down as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Still, the Court handed down its judgment to that effect only on 23 April 2009 so the law remained intact and binding for almost 4 years. It gave rise to a plethora of doubts, including around fundamental principles such as judicial discretion as well as more practical ones pertaining to the procedure to follow in the case of offenders between 17 and 18 years old who, according to the Polish law, cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment. One notable difficulty triggered by the meaning of Article 148 § 2 begged the question whether a sentence of 25 years' imprisonment may be extraordinarily mitigated something the Criminal Code, as it stood
